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This paper studies the impact of mortality in the districts/states represented in key congres-
sional groups (i.e. committees, subcommittees, and parties) on the National Institutes of Health
(NIH) allocation of medical research funds across diseases, for the period 1985-2002. Exploiting
the recomposition of any group after congressional elections, I find that congressmen who sit in
the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Labor, Health and Human Services, Education and
Related Agencies appear successful in steering more funds towards research on diseases that affect
their constituents disproportionately. This effect is larger for clinical than for basic research. No
other relevant congressional group, except, to a lesser extent, the House majority, seems to impact
that allocation. No group significantly impacts the allocation of funds across states.
Keywords: Legislative Bargaining, Publicly-Provided Goods, Health Policy, Government Policy,
Medical Research.
JEL Classification Number: H4, I1
1 Introduction
While a vast literature studies the determinants of private investment in medical R&D (e.g. Ace-
moglu et al. 2006), little is known on the factors that set the priorities of publicly-supported medical
research. The total size of the US federal budget for medical research, however, is comparable to
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its private counterpart.1 In addition, abundant normative work emphasizes the value of that public
investment (e.g. Arrow 1962, Griliches, Klette and Møen 2000, and Murphy and Topel 2006), and
supports its high level.2 This paper presents a positive investigation of the actual use of that invest-
ment, through the study of the allocation of National Institutes of Health (NIH) funds across diseases.
My approach relies on the fact that the NIH agenda partly results from congressional bargaining
that takes place throughout the Appropriations process of federal funds. This process involves differ-
ent congressional groups - committees and subcommittees - that serve well defined institutional roles.
I find that congressmen who serve on a single, key, subcommittee, the House Appropriations Sub-
committee for Labor, Health and Human Services, Education and Related Agencies (HouS), appear
successful in steering NIH funds towards research on disease that affect disproportionately their con-
stituents. This subcommittee, together with the equivalent subcommittee in the Senate, is responsible
for designing the proposal for the NIH budget, which will then be discussed by the whole Congress.
Congressional records indeed show that congressmen aim to favor medical research that has higher
expected returns in terms of life-years saved. Public funding for research on a disease should therefore
reflect the trade-off between the productivity of research on that disease and its impact on mortality.
Mortality due to a disease, however, varies across districts and across states, so that it also varies
across congressional groups. I use this heterogeneity to estimate the effect of the distribution of life-
years lost in the districts/states of any potentially influential group on the distribution of NIH funds
across medical conditions. Since the productivity of research on a disease could be correlated with
that disease mortality, I use first differenced variables to perform this estimation. The first difference
transformation uses the fact that distribution of life-years lost in any congressional group changes
every two years, due to the changes in the composition of that group that may follow congressional
elections. For that purpose, I use longitudinal data that contain information on mortality for every
congressional group and on NIH funds awarded through type R grants, at the disease level or at a finer
level of aggregation, over the period 1985-2002. Type R grants are the most common NIH grants, and
support discrete and circumscribed projects, which can be matched to a well-defined disease category,
and represent more than half the NIH budget.
1For instance, the National Institutes of Health (NIH) budget and the private investment in pharmaceutical research
amounted respectively to around 30 and 40 billion dollars in 2006. See “AAAS Guide to R&D Funding Data,” available
on http://www.aaas.org/spp/rd/guide.shtml.
2As stated by Griliches, Klette and Møen 2000: “There is [...] little controversy among economists about the desir-
ability of governmental support to these activities.”
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Numerically, I find that an increase of 1 percent of life-years lost because of a disease in the
districts represented in HouS increases the funds for research on that disease by 0.8-1.1 percent. On
average, this effect corresponds to an increase of yearly funds for clinical research equal to around
$2300 for every additional life-year lost in the population of the districts represented in HouS.3 This
effect is much larger for clinical research, which, by definition, encompasses any research project that
involves human subjects, such as clinical trials, than for basic research, which refers to any other
project. Life-years lost in no other committee or subcommittee I consider have any robust effect on
the allocation of NIH funds.
These results identify mortality in HouS districts as a determinant of the NIH research agenda, as
long as diseases affecting more the constituents of HouS congressmen are not systematically more (or
systematically less) promising from a medical research perspective. The assignment of congressmen
into Appropriations subcommittees is decided within parties, at the beginning of every term, and
based on the list of subcommittees, ranked by order of preference, every congressman already assigned
to the Appropriations committees submits to his/her party. Although there is no formal congressional
rule governing who should sit in some given sub/committee, I couldn’t find any evidence suggesting
that congressmen were assigned to HouS based on their constituents’ health conditions. In fact, HouS
members may not have any distinct interest for the NIH budget, or health issues, since the NIH budget
is one among several issues they are in charge of, such as labor or education. Instead, congressmen
likely rank subcommittees membership according to the potential share of federal funds such mem-
bership would let them supervise. The combination of three factors cause this share to vary across
subcommittees: the size of the subcommittees, as well as the number of subcommittees a congressman
can be assigned to, are bounded by congressional rules, and the total sum of funds any Appropriations
subcommittee supervises is mostly exogenous.
If HouS members indeed derive the same utility from medical research as other representatives
on average, the previous estimations show that their greater influence on the NIH agenda results from
their membership to HouS in itself. These estimations thus provide an insight on the functioning of
Congress. This greater influence could stem from the fact that they design the very first proposal
that will be discussed in Congress, as in Baron and Ferejohn 1989’s theory of legislative bargaining,
it may also derive from their interactions with the NIH staff or with medical experts their position
3Unless mentioned otherwise, all the monetary amounts in this paper are in dollars of 2000.
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involves. If it were not the case, however, those estimations may only reflect heterogeneous prefer-
ences for medical research across congressmen. To address this latter concern, I examine the effect of
life-years lost in the House majority districts. Due to rules governing the organization of the House
Appropriations committees, the share of members of the majority serving on HouS, or on any other
Appropriations subcommittee, has to be approximately equal to the share of majority members in the
whole House. This institutional feature induces a strong correlation between mortality in HouS and
in House majority districts, and, in addition, I estimate that mortality in House majority districts im-
pacts positively the distribution of life-years lost across diseases. This estimation is consistent with the
previous results, and is equivalent to using life-years lost in House majority districts as an instrument
for life-years lost in HouS. This strong correlation limits the possibility to distinguish the respective
of effect of either group, though. To summarize, the affiliation to either HouS or the House majority
confers a larger power in the bargaining process on the allocation of NIH funds across diseases.
This paper stresses the limits of the independence of publicly-funded medical research from po-
litical influence, which is a major objective of the NIH organization. In fact, congressmen (and the
President) have full institutional authority over the federal budget for medical research in the US.
Each year, as part of the Appropriations process, they decide on the amount of federal funds allo-
cated to every institute composing the NIH.4 These institutes are in charge of awarding grants for
research on a well-defined set of topics that usually comprises a more or less wide group of pathologies
(such as the National Cancer Institute or the National Institute of Dental and Craniofacial Research).
Since the institutional rules governing the budget process do not let congressmen to decide on the
amount of funds devoted to a disease directly, but only on the allocation of funds across its institutes,
congressmen may only affect their expected distribution of funds across diseases, conditionally on the
distribution of funds across these units. To examine this point, I estimate the effect of life-years lost
on expected funds by disease and type of research. The results of this estimation confirm the previous
ones. Interestingly, the impact of the House majority is larger in these estimations. Although the
House majority has a substantial power to influence the allocation of NIH funds towards institutes,
4Two institutions are in charge of funding medical research, development and training specifically: the NIH and the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) agencies. Both have roughly the same budget, but the HHS supports
mainly health services and training, whereas the NIH distributes federal funds to research projects on biomedical topics.
Their budget far exceeds the budget of any other R&D agency, except for the Department of Defense agencies. For
instance, the budget of the National Science Foundation (NSF), which distributes grants to support research in any
scientific field, was about $ 3.6 billion in 2000. Source: The American Association for the Advancement of Science guide
to R&D funding data, available on http://www.aaas.org/spp/rd/guihist.htm
4
HouS thus appears to have more effective means to impact the actual research agenda of the NIH.
Using the same data aggregated at the state level, I then investigate the potential effect of ear-
marking of NIH funds. I find that the number of representatives from a given state in HouS, or in
any other group, has no significant on the sum of funds received by the research institutions located
in that state. “Usual pork-barrel”, although raised in numerous anecdotes and empirical studies thus
seems to have no substantial effect on the allocation of funds across states for the specific type of NIH
grants I consider.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next part provides a brief survey of the literature
to this paper. The next section inventories the main channels of congressmen’s control over the NIH
agenda. Section 3 describes the data used for this paper. Section 4 presents the empirical strategy
and Section 5 the results of the estimations. Finally, Section 6 discusses the results, focusing on the
difference between basic and clinical research, with a model that is the basis of the specification used
for the estimations.
Related literature. This paper contributes to two strands of the literature: literature on
medical R&D and literature on congressional bargaining. Several studies examine the impact of var-
ious sources of funding on the production of medical research (see e.g. Blume-Kohout, Kumar and
Sood 2009, Jacob and Lefgren 2007 specifically for the NIH, and the whole field called scientometrics).
Productivity of research varies substantially across sources of funding, which is consistent with the fact
that motivations other than scientific productivity impact investment decisions. Following the profit
incentives hypothesis, Azoulay and Tay 2003, Cerda 2003, Acemoglu and Linn 2004, Lichtenberg and
Waldfogel 2009 and Finkelstein 2004, for instance, show that changes in the (potential) demand for a
cure, or for a related good, induce changes in the nature or the volume of pharmaceutical innovations.
Among them, Azoulay and Tay 2003, Lichtenberg and Waldfogel 2009 and Finkelstein 2004 use public
health decisions or recommendations, regarding drugs for orphan diseases and vaccines, as exogenous
shocks on the demand of medical goods to control for the productivity of medical research. This
paper investigates the very factors driving public decisions themselves. These factors could be used to
understand better the complementarity between public and private research (David, Hall and Toole
2000, Hall, Mairesse and Mohnen 2010, Toole 2007), and their joint effect on medical innovations.
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Few papers study the factors that impact the amount of public funds devoted to research on
some given topic. Lichtenberg 2001 investigates the correlation between NIH funds and mortality.
Bhattacharya and Packalen 2008 and Cutler, Meara and Richards 2009 link the level of investment
in research to mortality in the US, the former using the same instruments as Acemoglu and Linn
2004. Like Ellison and Wolfram 2001 and Miller 2008, this paper stresses the role of political economy
on medical issues. The contribution of this paper to this literature is to show that the link between
mortality and public funding of medical research results from a combination of congressional power
and local concerns. In addition, this paper contributes to the open question of empirical effects of
the composition of majorities in Congress (see e.g. Jayachandran 2006 and Snowberg, Wolfers and
Zitzewitz 2006).
The local concerns studied here also differ from the local pork-barrel objectives usually raised in
the political economy literature on congressional bargaining. Several studies (e.g. Cohen and Noll
1991, Ferejohn 1974, Atlas et al. 1995 and Knight 2005) show how the geographic origin of members of
relevant committees affects the geographic allocation of federal funds. This influence has proven useful
in explaining other differences across states (e.g. Aghion et al. 2005 or Levitt and Snyder 1997). For
the NIH, Payne 1999, Payne 2003 and Hegde 2009 find some impact of congressional power on the ge-
ographic allocation of NIH funds. Indeed, Hegde 2009 finds that research centers located in the states
represented in HouS do receive more research funds, but mitigates the impact of such earmarking by
showing that this effect is limited to centers with relatively little expertise. The bulk of NIH funds
traditionally goes to the same small set of universities, which do have expertise in any field, so that,
on aggregate, earmarking to local research institutes should have limited consequences. The results
here are consistent with that hypothesis, since I find that no substantial pork-barrel at the state level.
2 Congressional control over the NIH budget
In his memoir The Art and Politics of Science, Harold Varmus, former head of the NIH, mentions
that he once received a call from the congresswoman Nancy Pelosi,
“asking [him] to add $50 million for the budget for AIDS research. As the representative
from one of the districts most heavily affected by the epidemic, her wishes were understand-
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able. Since she was a member of the House Appropriations Subcommittee for the NIH,
she was in a position to try to increase funds for AIDS research when the subcommittee
was debating the size of the NIH budget.”
He later adds that he “declined as politely as [he] could. Sometimes it was not so easy to say no.”
(Varmus 2009 p.163.) This example illustrates that congressmen are aware of the diseases affecting
their constituents, and that they are active in trying to influence the NIH budget priorities. Although
Varmus 2009 indicates that that phone call had little effect on the budget, Hegde 2009 provides several
examples suggesting that other similar attempts were successful.
Regardless of the actual success of such attempts, there are direct ways through which congressmen
can control, at least partly, the funding for research on a disease.
2.1 Control through the budget formulation
The main channel of congressmen’s control on the medical research agenda lies in the formulation
of the budget. Every year, the Appropriations committees of both chambers are in charge of designing
a budget proposal, based on a budget request from the NIH, that will then be submitted to the whole
Congress — the House of Representatives first, the Senate second.5 The Appropriations bill for the
NIH specifies the budget to be received by every institute composing the NIH. These institutes are
relatively autonomous units that fund projects on some specific area of scientific research. Some insti-
tutes are specifically responsible for supporting research on a single disease or set of diseases (such as
the National Cancer Institute, or the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases), whereas
others may award grants for basic research on any topic (such as the National Institute of General
Medical Sciences) or support projects studying specific technology (such as the National Institute of
Biomedical Imaging and Bioengineering). As a result, in several instances, the area of specialization
of the institutes and centers overlap, whereas some topics are strictly included in the area of a single
institute.
In addition to setting the budget of each institute, the Appropriations bill may also make addi-
tional recommendations on how to allocate funds across research topics. An examination of the bills
suggests that both research productivity and distributive concerns determine the allocation of the NIH
5Like the rest of the budget, it is enacted unless it is vetoed by the President.
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budget. The congressional report of the 104th Congress relative to the Departments of Labor, Health
and Human Services, and Education, and Related Agencies Appropriations bill contains the following
statement:6
“The [Appropriations] Committee believes that NIH should distribute funding on the ba-
sis of scientific opportunity.[...] To enhance NIH’s flexibility to allocate funding based on
scientific opportunity, the Committee has attempted to minimize the amount of direction
provided in the report accompanying the bill. [...] In stating that scientific opportunity
should be the basis for allocating research funding, the Committee understands that other
factors are also relevant to NIH’s decisions, including such considerations as the infectious
nature of a disease, the number of cases and deaths associated with a particular disease,
the Federal and other costs of treating a disease, the years of productive life lost due to a
particular disease, and the estimated proximity to research breakthroughs. The Commit-
tee does not presume to judge which criteria should take precedence in individual funding
decisions, but urges NIH to consider the full array of relevant criteria as it constructs its
research portfolio.”
The bills often specify how the funds might be allocated across topics within the institutes or
centers. As in the previous excerpt, the bills often repeat that the NIH has authority on the allocation
of funds, yet give precise suggestions for the use of those funds. For instance, the previous report
mentions:
“AIDS Funding. — Consistent with the philosophy outlined above, the Committee has
again chosen not to earmark a specific dollar amount for AIDS research and has not
provided a single appropriation for the Office of AIDS Research. In relying on NIH’s
recommendations for the allocation of the total funding provided by the Committee, the
Committee understands that it would be NIH’s intent to allocate AIDS funding in the
following manner:[...]” [The report then details the amount of funds for research on HIV
to be awarded by every institute or center.]
6104th Congress, 2nd Session House of Representatives, 104-659, Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services,
and Education, and Related Agencies Appropriation Report, 1997.
8
The Appropriations committees of either chamber, cited here, are not the only groups that may
influence the appropriations of funds across research areas: within the Appropriations committees,
the Subcommittees on Labor, Health and Human Services, Education and Related Agencies of the
Appropriations Committee have the specific task of drafting the NIH budget proposal; in the Senate,
the Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions is in charge of providing recommendations
for the NIH budget. Table 1 presents the list of groups I consider in this study and some information
on their role and their size.
2.2 Control through the NIH organization
The partition of the NIH itself results from congressional approval, a bill can create or terminate
an institute. A bill may also create other forms of autonomous programs, such as centers, to direct
funds to any specific area or interest. Between 1950 and 2002, the number of institutes composing the
NIH thus increased from 2 to 26. Table 12 reports the list of institutes in 2002. Overall, there is thus
little institutional limitation on congressmen and the president’s formal power over the distribution of
public funds across research topics.
3 Description of the Data
I use two sets of data for this study: data on mortality by districts or states represented in the
congressional groups reported in table 1, and data on the NIH type R grants. Both sets of data span
the period 1985-2002, i.e. nine terms. In addition to the two previous sources of data, I extracted the
composition of every congressional group from the Congressional directories.
The lower limit of the period of study stems from the difficulty to have a reliable estimate of
mortality due to HIV/AIDS or of medical research on that disease before 1985. The appearance and
the quick rise of HIV in the eighties as a major cause of deaths and as a main topic of research induced
substantial changes in the recording of diseases and classification of research topics. The upper limit
on the period of study stems from the unavailability, to my knowledge, of demographic data at the
district level after the redistricting of 2003 (see Adler 2008, Lublin 1997). Summary statistics for the
main variables defined below are reported in Table 2.
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3.1 Data on mortality and congressional groups
Data on mortality stem from the Vital Statistics files, which contain information from deaths
records for each year of the period, at the individual level. For every deceased person i, these data
files report the main cause of death, the age of the deceased person, denoted Ai, the state of the
deceased, and, depending on the year of death, additional demographic information. Given the set
Ω(c, d, s, y) of residents state s, who died of disease d in year y, and share some additional demographic
characteristics c, I define the variable m(c, d, s, y):




m(c, d, s, y) is the true sum of life-years lost to 100 years old among the residents of s sharing the
characteristics c, in the year y, because of disease d.
For a given senator S (respectively a representative R), let Ω(S, d, s, y) (respectively Ω(R, d, s, y))
be the set of deceased individuals who were residents of a state represented by senator S (respectively
of a district represented by representative R at the House). For any senator representing s, the variable
m(S, d, s, y) is thus the sum of life-years lost due to d in the whole state s.
With the previous notations, I denote m∗(c, d, s, y) the estimated value of m(c, d, s, y) using avail-
able data. The value m∗(S, d, s, y) is computed using equation 1 and the available data from Vital
statistics. It may differ from the actual m(S, d, s, y) if some deaths are not recorded, or information
on the deceased individual’s state of residence is missing, etc.
Since there is no information on deaths at the district level in the Vital Statistics files, m∗(R, d, s, y)
cannot be estimated directly. Instead, I use Adler 2008 and Lublin 1997, who provide aggregated data
by district and by Congress term, to compute m∗(R, ., ., .). Let w(R, c, s, t) the share of individuals
with characteristics c in s in Congress term t who reside in the district that R represents and C the
set of demographic characteristics that partition the set of individuals. I compute m∗(R, d, s, y) as:
m∗(R, d, s, y) =
∑
c∈C
w(R, c, s, t)m∗(c, d, s, y) (2)
where m∗(c, d, s, y) is the estimation of equation 1 with the Vital statistics data. By definition,∑
R,representative of s
∑
c∈C w(R, c, s, t) = 1. In addition to the errors stemming from the construction
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of the data, the variable m∗(R, d, s, y) will differ from the actual m(R, d, s, y) if mortality conditions
are heterogeneous in the population sharing characteristics c in the state s. This measurement may
then affect the estimations of the next sections. To check their robustness, I use three different sets of
demographic characteristics in the equation 2 that correspond to three partitions of the set of deceased
individuals:
- set of characteristics C1 ≡ {urban, rural} ,
- set of characteristics C2 ≡ {government employee, other},
- set of characteristics C3 ≡ {black, white, other}.
These partitions are aimed to match information on deceased individuals from the Vital statistics,
and information on district composition used to compute w(R, c, s, y) variables, which are provided in
Lublin 1997 or Adler 2008.7







m∗(X, d, s, y) (3)
The variable LY gd,t represents the average sum of life-years lost because of disease d in year y, in
the district (resp. state) of the representatives (resp. senators) X belonging to the group g in Congress
term t (counting twice a state if both its senators belong to g).
Remarks: the previous equations allow the year variable y of the mortality files to differ from the
Congress term variable t of the congressional groups and congressional districts data. In what follows,
I use the Vital Statistics file for the year 1989 to estimate life-years lost variables for all the groups
of Table 1 and all the Congress terms, that is I compute life-years lost as though the distribution
of mortality had been constant throughout years, equal to mortality in 1989.8 I use mortality data
from a single year, instead of data of the current years corresponding to the Congress term t, to avoid
potential sources of biases when estimating the impact of life-years lost on research spending. If some
7Since Lublin 1997 and Adler 2008 do not contain information after 1998, I assume that the composition of the
districts did not change between 1998 and 2002 to compute life-years lost in districts after 1998. The redistricting of
2003 prevents to interpolate district data after 2002.
8Districts composition or borders may vary throughout terms, though.
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investment in medical research on a disease in a given year decreases mortality due to this disease
the following years, changes in mortality from one year to another will be highly correlated across
groups, assuming groups are not too different from the US population. This correlation will create
collinearity across the first-difference of life years lost variables, which could bias the estimation of the
coefficients. In fact, since the change in mortality in any group would then be correlated with virtually
any sample of US residents that is close enough to the whole population, the estimation would suffer
from omitted-variable bias.
In practice, using mortality data from 1989 or from some other year shouldn’t change the results
of the estimations, since the distribution of mortality across states and diseases has been extremely
stable over time.9 However, I chose 1989 because Vital statistics before that year do not provide as
detailed information on the ethnicity of the deceased, which I use to compute life-years lost at the
district level.
Table 13 reports summary statistics of life-years lost by disease, for the House as a whole in 1989,
and for the House majority, and the House Appropriations Subcommittee for the NIH. The set of
thirteen diseases (or disease categories) retained in this study causes more than 90 per cent of the
deaths in the US in 1989. All the other deaths are due to accidents, murders, or unidentifiable causes.
The table shows the correlation between the distribution of life-years lost across diseases in these
groups. The standard deviation of life-years lost in the House majority and the House Subcommittee
reflect changes in the composition of these groups every Congress term, a necessary condition for the
empirical strategy.
3.2 Data on NIH grants
The second set of data derives from detailed information on R01 grants at the grant level provided
in various NIH databases: the REsearch Portfolio Online Reporting Tools (REPORT) and the NIH
data supplied by the NBER (Lichtenberg 2001) for the period 1986-1991.10 I use these data to gather
the following information for every competing “type R” grant: the fiscal year the grant was awarded
9I checked that this claim is true using mortality data for 1985, when possible, and 1998.
10For a previous version of this paper, I used a subsample of these data that were available on the Computer Re-
trieval of Information on Scientific Projects (CRISP) database, a website that has been discontinued and replaced
by the REPORT database. Some of the estimations differ quantitatively, but not qualitatively from the results pre-
sented here. Except for the NBER data, all the other data are now available on http://report.nih.gov/ or from
http://projectreporter.nih.gov/reporter.cfm.
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(which is by definition one year after the budget is voted on), the total amount of funds received by
the grantee for the whole length of the grant, the state where the research institution of the grantee
is located, the specific agency within the NIH awarding the grant and a set of keywords describing
the research project funded by the grant. “Type R”, and especially R01, is by far the most common
type of grant. The NIH documentation, available on http://grants.nih.gov/grants/funding/r01.htm,
mentions: “The Research Project Grant (R01) is the original and historically oldest grant mechanism
used by NIH. The R01 provides support for health-related research and development based on the
mission of the NIH. [...] The Research Project (R01) grant is an award made to support a discrete,
specified, circumscribed project to be performed by the named investigator(s) in an area representing
the investigator’s specific interest and competencies, based on the mission of the NIH.” Matching other
grants to disease categories is much harder, since they either cover too many different topics, or no
specific topic.
The keywords describing a grant mention whether the research hereby funded involved human
subjects. I define such research as clinical, and the other projects as basic.
When possible, I also match every grant to a unique disease in the set of disease or disease cate-
gories retained here (see Table 13). The matching is not possible for some grants that support research
on sets of conditions that are too large to be matched with a unique disease (e.g. pathology), or that
are related to non-lethal conditions (e.g. back injury).11 Finally, due to missing information, some
grants cannot be matched to a US state.
For the purpose of this paper, I aggregated these data so as to obtain the total amount of funds
awarded by disease, by type of research and by Congress term (and by state, for some specifications). I
also use series of appropriations aggregated by institute (available on the http://www.nih.gov/about/almanac/appropriations/index.htm)
for some additional results.
Remark. Table 13 reports some summary statistics by disease and type of research. They show
the positive correlation between the funds for research on a disease, either basic or clinical, and the
share of life-years lost, in the US or in the House majority. The major change in life-years lost occurred
in 1995 (after the 1994 elections), when the majority of the House became Republican, in figure 1, I
plot the net increase in NIH type R funds with respect to the net increase in the average log of life-
years lost in House majority districts before and after the 1994 elections. The graph shows a positive
11The matching strategy follows Toole 2007.
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correlation. The purpose of the estimations of the next sections is to refine this result.
4 Empirical Strategy
4.1 Specification
Consider a group g of interest, LYd,t the share of life-years lost due to disease d in the districts
represented in the group g at t, formally defined in equation 3.12 The objective of the empirical part
is to estimate the effect of these two variables on the allocation of public funds for medical research.
It relies on the specification:
logFd,θ,t = cd,θ + β logLYd,t + βClinic logLYd,t × Clinicθ + µXd,θ,t + εd,θ,t (4)
where Fd,θ,t is the amount of funds for research on disease d of type θ awarded in Congress term
t, and Clinicθ is a dummy variable equal to one if θ = clinical, and 0 if θ = basic. The vector of
variables Xd,θ,t may include control variables such as life-years lost variables for other groups, as well as
Congress term dummy variables, and their interactions with Clinicθ. The term cd,θ is the unobserved
fixed effect for research on disease d of type θ. In all estimations, standard errors are clustered at the
disease and type of research level.
For some additional results, I also use a finest level of aggregation to estimate a linear model of
the form:
logFd,θ,s,t = cd,θ,s+β logLYd,t+βClinic logLYd,t×Clinicθ+ρNs,t+ρClinicNs,t×Clinicθ+µXd,θ,s,t+εd,θ,s,t
(5)
where Ns,t is the number of congressmen in group g who represent the state s, or a district of that
state, and where Fd,θ,s,t is the amount of funds for research on disease d of type θ awarded to research
institutions in state s, in Congress term t. The vector of variables Xd,θ,s,t may now include control
variables such as life-years or number of state congressmen variables for other groups, as well as
Congress term dummy variables, and their interactions with Clinicθ. The term cd,θ,s is the unobserved
12The superscript .g on these variables, displayed in equation 3, is omitted here for readability.
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fixed effect for research on disease d of type θ performed in state s. In all estimations, standard errors
are clustered at the disease and type of research and state level.
4.2 Identification assumptions
The first objective of this paper is to identify non-scientific factors affecting the funding of publicly-
funded medical research. The factors studied here, life-years lost across diseases in some congressional
group, result from the recomposition of that group following Congressional elections, every two years.
Hence, the identification holds if the selection of members of that group is not based on a systematically
higher (or systematically lower) productivity of research on the diseases affecting disproportionately
their constituents (Assumption 1).
The coefficients β and βClinic also provide information on the balance of powers in Congress under
the additional identification assumption that, on average, members of a given group do not derive a
larger utility from medical research funding than other congressmen (Assumption 2). In other words,
members of that group are not “preference outliers”. If this assumption fails, a positive coefficient β
(or βClinic) may just stem from the fact that the NIH budget reflects current Congressmen’s prefer-
ences. If this assumption holds, a positive β would indicate that members of that group have a larger
bargaining power on the allocation of NIH funds, a larger bargaining power they obtain through their
membership to that group.
Do Assumptions 1 and/or 2 hold? Let’s consider majority groups of either chamber first. The
affiliation of a congressman to the majority party is a direct consequence of congressional elections. If
they are elected, members of any party may a priori take part in any debate regarding the budget, not
only the NIH budget. Since the timing of elections is exogenous, and medical research priorities have
never been a theme of congressional electoral debates, the recomposition of these groups should be
independent of medical research concerns. Assumptions 1 and 2 should thus hold for these groups.13
Let’s now consider the Appropriations committees and subcommittees. Frisch and Kelly 2006
or Schneider 2007 describe the procedures leading to the composition of these groups: following each
election, the distribution of committee affiliations is decided within each party, after each congressman
has submitted the list of committees, ranked by order of preferences. The distribution of subcommit-
13A few congressmen switched parties at some point of the period I study. Counting them in either party does not
change the following estimations.
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tee seats follows a similar procedure. No congressional rule imposes any constraint on the match-
ing between preferences and groups memberships and, in practice, a congressman’s assignment to a
sub/committee will depend on her/his preferences and clout at the time of the process. In particular,
no feature of the membership process indicates that Assumption 1 fails for any of the sub/committees
I consider here, and I could not find any congressional document, or any feature of the affiliation
process, suggesting that the composition of these groups were linked to research productivity factors.
Given that sub/committees members have specific areas of specialization, Assumption 2 may be
more questionable for these groups. Members of both subcommittees (in the House and in the Senate),
however - and even more so the whole Appropriations committees - are in charge of several types of
spending besides the NIH budget, such as education or labor issues. In addition, congressional rules
limit the number of committees and subcommittees a congressman may belong to, as well as the num-
ber of members of Appropriations subcommittees. In addition, the total discretionary budget that any
budget authority agency will be in charge of seems mostly exogenous, heterogeneous across agencies,
and roughly stable over the period studied from the information on discretionary spending provided
in Tables 5.1 to 5.6 available on http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/Historicals/. These three
last facts combined suggest that any congressman can assess the expected share of federal funds that
membership to any subcommittee he or she will have authority over, and may rank subcommittees
according to that share.14 The variety of issues falling under the responsibility of the members of
HouS and its Senate counterpart, and the heterogeneity of budget sets across Appropriations subcom-
mittees thus support Assumption 2 for these groups. To my knowledge, no study of the selection of
congressmen into the subcommittees indicates that its members have any distinct interest for medical
research priorities. (As a robustness check though, I perform an instrumental variable analysis to
relax Assumption 2 for HouS. The instrument is contingent to the results of the estimations so that,
to simplify the presentation, I report the discussion of this approach to the next section).
Some other factors, inherent to the construction of the life-years lost variables, may also bias the
estimations and were discussed in the section 3.1. I will use the set of characteristics C3 of section
3.1 to compute life-years lost at the district level for the first estimations in the next section, then
14In spite of the increase of the NIH budget in the late nineties the distribution of these shares have been roughly stable
over the period (see Dalton 2000 for information on the increase and “Table 5.5. Percentage Distribution of Discretionary
Budget Authority by Agency: 1976-2015” on http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/Historicals/ for information on
the budget).
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perform these same estimations using the two other possible life-years lost.
5 Results
5.1 Allocation of funds across diseases
This section focuses on the impact of life-years lost across diseases and groups on the allocation
of funds across diseases, i.e. on the estimation of the coefficients β and βClinic of equations 4 for the
set of groups of table 1.
Regressions at the disease, type of research level. Table 3 reports the OLS estimation of
the coefficients of the first difference of equation 4, separately for every group, twice.15 The first series
of estimations shows that life-years lost in three groups may impact NIH funds: HouS, its equivalent
in the Senate, and the House majority. In all three cases, the effect is larger clinical than for basic
research. In fact, the effect of HouS variables on basic research is not significantly different from zero
here. The second series of estimations (columns 8 to 13), indicate that the effect of HouS holds when
controlling for other groups. Depending on whether we take into account the estimated coefficient β̂, a
1 percent increase in life-years lost in districts represented in HouS leads to a 0.8-1.1 percent increase
in funds for clinical research.
Regressions at the disease, type of research and state level. The previous specifications
fit best the actual formulation of the budget described in section 2. However, as a robustness check,
I estimate the parameters of equation 5 in Table 4, with robust standard errors clustered by disease,
type of research and state.16 These estimations confirm the effect of life-years lost in districts of HouS
members on clinical research and the absence of effect of this group on the funds for basic research.
This effect is robust to the inclusion of variables Ns,t, which control for the potential earmarking of
research funds to the representatives’ states. (The estimated coefficients of Ns,t are reported later for
clarity.) The information provided by this regression suffers from the fact that the amount of research
across states is extremely heterogeneous, however. This heterogeneity likely explains the negative co-
efficient of life-years lost in the House Appropriations committee. In fact, the effect of any group, other
15The small size of the sample and the correlation between life-years lost variables would limit the interpretation of a
regression including all life-years lost variables at once.
16As mentioned in the Section 3, I assume that the missing observations (less than 200 out of 10400) result from
missing information on the amount of funds for research on a given disease of a given type in a given state. A Tobit
estimation would give similar results.
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than HouS, disappears when I use the level of funds (in $ millions), as the dependent variable, and
average life-years lost as defined in equation 3, and not the Log of these variables, in the estimation
of equation 5 (Table 5). Given that HouS contains around 14 members, and that data are aggregated
by Congress terms (that is two years), columns 1,2 or 3 in Table 5 show that an additional life-year
lost due to a disease in HouS leads to an increase of NIH funds by year for clinical research on that
disease equal to around 6.4×10
6
2×14×100 ' $2300 by year.
Measurement error of life-years lost variables. Table 6 reports the result of the regression
in first differences of variants of equation 4 for the three different estimations of life-years lost at the
district level defined by the set of characteristics C1, C2 or C3, used to partition Vital statistics data
(see section 3.1). For ease of comparison, I report the results for all three possible measures of life-years
lost (so that column (9) in Table 6 and column (5) of Table 3 are the same).
The estimations of columns with most controls show that the effect of HouS is more robust to
changes in the method used to compute life-years lost than the effect of House majority, although
life-years lost in the House majority may have both an impact on basic and clinical research. Overall,
all estimations are consistent with the previous results. No coefficient is significantly negative. These
results support the hypothesis that measurement error induced by the lack of mortality data at the
district level biases the effect of life-years lost in either group on the NIH budget towards zero.
Whose bargaining power is it? If Assumption 2 does not hold for HouS congressmen, in-
terpreting the impact of life-years lost in HouS as evidence of bargaining power of its members is
questionable. Assumption 2 more likely holds for the composition of the House majority, which also
has an effect on NIH funds. Both variables may be correlated, however, since congressional rules
prescribe the share of majority members in HouS to approximate the share of majority members in
the whole House.
The correlations reported in columns (1), (4) and (7) of Table 7, controlling for Congress terms,
show that it is indeed the case. In fact, the more correlated they are, the more significant the effect
of House majority life-years lost variable is. For completeness, I also report the second stage of the
SLS estimation that uses the first difference of life-years lost in House majority districts as an instru-
ment for life-years lost in HouS districts (although columns (2),(5) and (8) are essentially the same as
columns (2),(5) and (8) of Table 6).
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To summarize, life-years lost in the districts represented in HouS districts have a significant and
robust impact on the allocation of funds across diseases, more so for clinical than for basic research.
This impact stems from some additional bargaining power congressmen obtain from belonging to ei-
ther HouS, the majority of the House or any of these groups.
Counterfactual estimation Which diseases benefited from the 1995 majority change? To ad-
dress this question, I use the estimated coefficients of Column (4) in Table 3 to estimate the average
yearly allocation of funds across diseases after 1994 if majority had not changed in 1994. The results
are presented in Table 8. I find that the majority change mainly affected negatively funding on HIV
and Congenital disorders, and affected positively funding for research on Central Nervous System
disorders, Psychiatric conditions, and Respiratory disorders.
5.2 Allocation of funds across states
Table 9 reports the estimations of the coefficients ρ and ρClinic of equation 5 and some variants.
The number of representatives of a state in HouS shows no significant positive effect on the research
funds for that state, regardless of whether other groups’ variables are included in the regressions. (In
fact, it seems to have a negative impact on the funds by state; this result, however, is not robust to
the inclusion of additional controls). No group seems to have any significant positive effect on the
distribution of funds across states. These results do not imply that earmarking does not exist at all —
in fact some empirical studies and anecdotal evidence suggest the opposite — but they suggest that
pork-barrel either affects the redistribution within states or involves relatively small amounts of funds.
The lack of any significant effect is quite surprising nevertheless, especially for the specifications
that do not include the social cost variables (e.g. Column 1 of table 9), since one may conjecture
that the research interests of research institutions are correlated with the health conditions of their
neighboring population. To investigate further that conjecture, I compute the log of the share of
life-years lost LY sd,t ≡
life−yearssd∑
d life−yearssd
separately for every state, and regress the log of funds on that
variable, as in:
logFd,θ,s,t = ω logLY
s
d,t + ωClinic logLY
s
d,t × Clinicθ +Xd,θ,s,t + ud,θ,s,t (6)
where Xd,θ,s,t may include dummy variables for every Congress term, type of research, disease and
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state, and the interactions between the type of research and other dummy variables. The results (see
Table 10) do show some significant impact of life-years lost on research funds at the state level, but
this impact is not significant once additional control variables are included. In fact, the figure 2, which
represents the normalized log of funds with respect to the normalized log of life-years lost for every
state shows that no correlation is visible for most diseases.
6 Discussion
6.1 What causes a group’s bargaining power?
As was demonstrated in the seminal paper of Baron and Ferejohn 1989, and confirmed in the
empirical work of Knight 2005, being the proposer provides bargaining power, if congressmen are
impatient, when the issue at stake is the distribution of some budget across states or districts. Among
the groups I consider, the actual proposer is indeed HouS. Its Senate equivalent also participates
to the design of the proposal, but its members by definition do not participate to the initial vote
of the budget, which occurs in the House. Similarly, the composition of the Senate Appropriations
subcommittee on Labor and Health can make recommendations, which are non-binding, and do not
seem to steer funds towards diseases affecting more their constituents.
In addition to these theoretical arguments, the quotation from Varmus 2009 also suggests that
HouS members may tend more to contact directly the NIH staff, whom they should meet more often
than the rest of Congress due to their role in the Appropriations process. Apart from access to NIH
staff, HouS members may also have a better understanding of how the allocation of funds across
institutes or autonomous programs will impact actual funding by disease.
6.2 Why is the effect on clinical research larger?
By definition, clinical research is more applied and, as such, should lead faster to pharmaceutical
innovations. In addition, the probability that some investment in research on a given disease indeed
leads to some discovery on this disease, and not on another one, may be larger for clinical than basic
research. However, these arguments could explain why congressmen prefer clinical to basic research,
not why they seem less prone to influence the allocation of funds for basic research than for clinical
research.
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The lack of influence of congressmen could instead stem from the fact that the productivity
of clinical research may be more easily estimated by non-specialists of medical research than basic
research. This difference derives from the complexity of scientific knowledge as well as from the legal
restrictions that bind the uncertainty of clinical research, which, by definition, uses human data. If
congressmen’ s information on basic research is poor enough, they should delegate the allocation of
these funds to the NIH staff, who shares congressmen’s concern for research productivity, but has no
reason to take into account the specific health conditions of powerful congressmen’s electorate.17 I
develop this hypothesis in a model presented in Appendix. An extended version of this model is the
basis for the specification of the empirical part.
Although the model is substantially different from Aghion and Tirole 1997, to fit the specific
question of this paper, proposition 1 raises a similar point: congressmen’s authority on the distribution
of funds for basic research is formal. Due to their lack of information on the productivity of this type
of research, they prefer to delegate the allocation decision to the NIH. Anecdotal evidence from the
description of the NIH organization also supports that hypothesis: the explicit mission of one agency,
the National Institute of General Medical Sciences, is to fund basic research on any disease. The
allocation of the budget of this agency across diseases is thus effectively delegated to its staff.18 As
argued by Foucault 1963, political authority influences the focus of medical research, at least through
the funding of this research. However, the concern for scientific productivity limits the effect of this
authority on basic research.
6.3 Channel of congressmen’s influence
According to the rules of the budget procedure, the unique channel of congressmen’s influence lies
in their authority over the allocation of funds across the NIH autonomous units (in addition to the
possibility to create such units, which rarely occur in comparison to the yearly Appropriations process).
If their preferences indeed depend on the distribution of funds across diseases (and type of research),
they then have only the possibility to maximize their expected utility knowing the distribution of
funds across those autonomous units. To investigate this point, I replace logFd,θ,t in equation 4
with E[logFd,θ,t|{Fi,t}i∈NIH ], where {Fi,t}i∈NIH is the distribution of total budgets awarded to every
17NIH officials are usually appointed for several years.
18Congressional bills may yet give some directions for the use of that budget. Moreover, a substantial number of basic
grants are awarded by other agencies or smaller subdivisions of the NIH.
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autonomous unit of the NIH.19





αd,θ,i logFi,t + γXd,θ,t + εd,θ,t (7)
where Fi,t is the amount of funds allocated to institute i of the NIH at t, and Xd,θ,t potential addi-
tional controls, and then use the predicted value ˆlogFd,θ,t as an estimation of E[logFd,θ,t|{Fi,t}i∈NIH ].
Since the size of the sample is small in comparison to the number of NIH units, the predicted value
will be so close to the actual value of logFd,θ,t that the results of the estimation of the coefficients of
4 will be essentially the same as in Table 6.20
The other method is to compute first the average share of funds by disease and by type of research




composing the NIH for the years preceding the Congress term
t, where Fd,θ,i,y is the amount of R grants awarded in year y to research on disease d and type θ by
the institute i. I then estimate E[logFd,θ,t|{Fi,t}i∈NIH ] as
∑
i∈NIH βd,θ,i logFi,t, that is I approximate
the expected log of funds with the log of expected funds. The results of the estimation of equation 4
using this latter method are shown in Table 11. Although they should be interpreted in regard of the
lack of any obvious way to know how congressmen form their expectations about NIH funds, these
estimations strongly support the hypothesis that the House majority members try to steer NIH funds
towards diseases that affect more their constituents through the possibility to direct funds towards
NIH autonomous units, whereas the smaller (yet significant) coefficients of HouS life-years lost suggest
that HouS members may have more effective ways to influence the NIH budget than this channel.
7 Conclusion
This paper finds that the social cost of a disease, measured in life-years lost, on the constituents
represented either in the majority party of the House or in the subcommittee of the House Appropria-
tions Committee in charge of health issues has a positive impact on the NIH funds for clinical research
19These budgets thus include both funds that will be awarded through type R grants, and other types of spending.
20In fact, the model is even over-identified if I estimate 7 aggregating observations at the Congress term level. Instead,
I thus estimate it aggregating NIH funds at the year level.
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on that disease awarded through R grants. In addition, there is no significant effect of the state origin
of the members of these groups on the allocation of funds across states.
The main channel of influence of congressmen over the medical research agenda relies on their
control of the allocation of funds across the multiple units composing the NIH. This paper thus shows
that the change in the rules that govern the rules of formulation of the budget would limit congress-
men’s influence. A more radical approach would be to reduce the number of these units. This change
is advocated by Varmus 2009, who “expressed [his] anxieties about the continuing proliferation of au-
tonomous units at the NIH”.21 Such a change may decrease congressmen’s incentives to devote such
a large of federal funds to support medical research, however. Whether such a change would benefit
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Figure 1: Increase in life-years lost in House majority districts and increase in funds for research before
and after 1994.
Notes: The x-axis represents the difference between the log of the share of life-years lost in the districts
represented in the House majority before and after the 1995 majority change in the House. The y-axis
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Figure 2: Share of life years lost and NIH funds awarded during the period 1985-2002, by state and
by disease.
Notes: See the text for the construction of the data. The x-axis represents the log of the share of






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. # Obs.
Funds Fd,s,θ,t 10.594 24.84 0 519.036 11700
Funds Fd,θ,t 529.695 503.419 28.343 2999 234
Log Fd,s,θ,t 14.388 2.418 3.281 20.067 11558
Log Fd,θ,t 19.673 0.958 17.16 21.822 234
Log of life-years lost in:
Senate Labor Com. 566.17 756.99 68.727 3458.584 234
Senate Appropriations Com. 615.953 800.877 108.911 4069.108 234
Senate Appropriations Subcom. 581.329 775.639 96.613 4013.414 234
Senate Majority 660.639 868.89 104.237 3980.352 234
House Appropriations Com. 77.782 101.165 15.064 410.586 234
HouS 78.136 102.255 14.675 432.073 234
House Majority 77.974 101.002 15.115 408.931 234
Number of state congressmen in:
Senate Labor Com. 0.342 0.498 0 2 450
Senate Appropriations Com. 0.576 0.55 0 2 450
Senate Appropriations Subcom. 0.3 0.482 0 2 450
Senate Majority 1.087 0.775 0 2 450
House Appropriations Com. 1.207 1.377 0 7 450
HouS 0.273 0.516 0 2 450
House Majority 4.896 5.146 0 30 450
Notes: Fd,θ,s,t denotes funds for research on disease d of type θ, awarded to research institutes in state s in Congress term t. The
Senate (or House) Appropriations Subcom. is the Appropriations subcommittee for Labor, Health etc., in charge of the NIH budget






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4: Increase in life-years lost and NIH funds, by disease, type of research and state
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable is Log of funds by disease, by type of research and by state
Log of life-years lost in:
HouS 0.40+ -0.079 0.25 0.25
(0.23) (0.30) (0.33) (0.33)
HouS ×Clinic 0.96* 0.85+ 0.85+
(0.45) (0.50) (0.50)
House Majority 0.29 0.12 0.12
(0.42) (0.53) (0.53)
House Maj. ×Clinic -0.0068 -0.57 -0.58
(0.71) (0.88) (0.87)
House Appropriations Com. -2.63* -2.63*
(1.24) (1.24)
House Appr. Com. ×Clinic -0.76 -0.77
(2.03) (2.03)
Senate Appropriations Subcom. -0.084 -0.085
(0.23) (0.23)
Senate Appr. Subcom. ×Clinic 0.19 0.19
(0.36) (0.36)
Senate Majority -0.21 -0.21
(0.45) (0.45)
Senate Maj. ×Clinic -0.57 -0.57
(0.72) (0.72)
Senate Appropriations Com. 0.41 0.41
(0.42) (0.42)
Senate Appr. Com. ×Clinic 0.33 0.33
(0.66) (0.66)
Senate Labor Com. -0.089 -0.089
(0.19) (0.19)
Senate Lab. Com. ×Clinic -0.41 -0.41
(0.28) (0.28)
Observations 10,212 10,212 10,212 10,212 10,212
R2 0.021 0.021 0.019 0.021 0.023
Notes: this table reports the OLS estimation of the first difference of equation 5 for the period 1985-2002. The dependent variable
funds by disease, type of research and state is the difference between the log of NIH funds for research of type θ on disease d
awarded through R grants to research institutes in state s in Congress terms t and t − 1. Log of life-years lost in ... is the
difference between the log of the share of life-years lost to 100 due to disease d in the districts/states represented in ... in Congress
terms t and t− 1. Column (4) includes the number of congressmen of state s represented in any group in the control variables. All
regressions include dummies for Congress terms and type of research and their interactions. Cluster-robust standard errors are in
parentheses. * p<0.05, + p<0.1.
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Table 5: Increase in life-years lost and NIH funds - in levels
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent variable is funds by disease and by type of research
and by state
Life-years lost:
HouS -1.34 -1.17 -0.027 -0.024 -0.037
(0.87) (1.05) (0.027) (0.026) (0.042)
HouS ×Clinic 6.43* 6.44* 0.13* 0.13* 0.16*
(1.95) (2.84) (0.041) (0.042) (0.057)
House Majority -1.68 -0.72 -0.034 -0.014 0.033
(2.73) (2.82) (0.047) (0.043) (0.044)
House Maj. ×Clinic 5.16 -0.073 0.10+ -0.0030 -0.084
(4.28) (5.62) (0.061) (0.058) (0.066)
House Appropriations Com. 0.0047
(0.12)
House Appr. Com. ×Clinic 0.15
(0.15)
Senate Appropriations Subcom. -0.0015
(0.0015)




Senate Maj. ×Clinic 0.0024
(0.0020)
Senate Appropriations Com. 0.0022+
(0.0014)
Senate Appr. Com. ×Clinic -0.00077
(0.0018)
Senate Labor Com. -0.00018
(0.0010)
Senate Lab. Com. ×Clinic -0.0019
(0.0014)
Observations 208 208 208 10,212 10,212 10,212 10,212
R2 0.341 0.332 0.341 0.037 0.036 0.037 0.039
Notes: this table reports the OLS estimation of the first difference of equation 4 in Column 1 (resp. equation 5 in Columns 2 to 4)
for the period 1985-2002 with the following modifications. The dependent variable funds by disease, type of research (resp. funds
by disease, type of research, and state) is the difference between the NIH funds (in $ million) awarded for research of type θ, on
disease d (resp. of type θ, on disease d, to research institutes in state s) in Congress terms t and t− 1. Life-years lost in ... is the
difference between the average number of life-years lost to 100 (divided by 100) due to disease d in the districts/states represented
in ... in Congress terms t and t− 1, see equation 3). All regressions include dummies for Congress terms and type of research and





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 8: Estimation of the effect of 1995 majority shift
All Clinical
Disease Actual Counterfactual Actual Counterfactual
Blood 5.41e+07 5.35e+07 1.86e+07 1.84e+07
CNS 4.81e+08 4.66e+08 1.96e+08 1.89e+08
Cardiovascular 3.26e+08 3.24e+08 1.40e+08 1.39e+08
Congenital 1.95e+08 2.20e+08 6.57e+07 7.60e+07
Digestive 1.96e+08 2.00e+08 7.77e+07 8.00e+07
Endocrine 4.71e+08 4.82e+08 1.25e+08 1.28e+08
HIV 8.04e+08 9.47e+08 3.43e+08 4.15e+08
Infectious 7.67e+08 8.07e+08 1.62e+08 1.72e+08
Psychiatric 5.08e+08 4.89e+08 3.44e+08 3.30e+08
Reproductive 3.24e+08 3.23e+08 1.51e+08 1.50e+08
Respiratory 8.77e+07 8.53e+07 3.53e+07 3.42e+07
Skin 1.90e+08 1.89e+08 9.29e+07 9.23e+07
Urinary 9.12e+07 9.35e+07 3.26e+07 3.35e+07
Total 3.46e+08 3.60e+08 1.37e+08 1.43e+08
Notes: the table presents the estimation of the actual and counterfactual average yearly amount of funds
that would have been awarded through competing R grants between 1995 and 2002 for any type of
research (All), and for clinical research only (Clinical), if the House majority had not changed in 1995.
The counterfactual estimations rely on the specification of column (4) in Table 3.
39
Table 9: Effect of state affiliation of congressmen on NIH funds
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable: Log of funds by disease, by type by state by type of research
of research and by state and by state
Number of state congressmen in:
HouS -0.040 -0.026 -0.018 -0.094
(0.028) (0.031) (0.024) (0.062)
HouS ×Clinic -0.025 -0.023 0.14
(0.047) (0.052) (0.10)
House Majority -0.00015 -0.00091 -0.0043 -0.0086
(0.0074) (0.0075) (0.0071) (0.017)
House Maj. ×Clinic 0.0083 0.0063 0.015
(0.012) (0.013) (0.026)
House Appropriations Com. -0.020 -0.020 0.025
(0.023) (0.019) (0.044)
House Appr. Com. ×Clinic -0.0079 -0.088
(0.036) (0.068)
Senate Appropriations Subcom. 0.084 -0.029 0.022
(0.063) (0.052) (0.070)
Senate Appr. Subcom. ×Clinic 0.014 -0.071
(0.092) (0.18)
Senate Majority 0.030 0.0052 0.060
(0.019) (0.025) (0.055)
Senate Maj. ×Clinic -0.017 -0.062
(0.030) (0.073)
Senate Appropriations Com. -0.057 0.0020 -0.0012
(0.047) (0.039) (0.076)
Senate Appr. Com. ×Clinic 0.081 0.054
(0.070) (0.13)
Senate Labor Com. 0.022 0.0073 0.098
(0.033) (0.032) (0.071)
Senate Lab. Com. ×Clinic -0.046 -0.21*
(0.055) (0.099)
Observations 10,212 10,212 10,212 400 796
R2 0.017 0.017 0.018 0.105 0.198
Notes: this table reports the OLS estimation of the first difference of equation 5 for the period 1985-2002. The dependent variable
funds by disease, type of research and state is the difference between the log of NIH funds for research of type θ on disease d
awarded through R01 grants to research institutes in state s in Congress terms t and t− 1. Number of state congressmen in ... is
the difference between the number of congressmen from state s in ... in Congress terms t and t− 1. Column (3) includes controls
for the log of life-years lost in any group. Columns (4) and (5) aggregate data at the state level and state and type of research
level respectively. All regressions include dummies for Congress terms and type of research and their interactions. Cluster-robust
standard errors are in parentheses. * p<0.05, + p<0.1.
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Table 10: Effect of local life-years lost on research focus
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable is funds by disease, type of research and state
Log of life-years lost in state s 0.095* 0.094* 0.055
(0.046) (0.046) (0.057)
Log of life-years lost in state s × Clinicθ 0.079
(0.069)
Interaction Congress term-Clinicθ No Yes Yes
Interaction Disease-Clinicθ No Yes Yes
Observations 11,558 11,558 11,558
R2 0.854 0.870 0.872
Notes: this table reports the OLS estimation of equation 6 for the period 1985-2002. The dependent
variable funds by disease, type of research and state is the log of NIH funds for research of type θ on
disease d awarded through R grants to research institutes in state s in Congress terms t and t− 1. Life-
years lost in state s is the log of life-years lost to 100 due to disease d in the districts/states represented in
state s in Congress terms t. Clinic equals 1 if the type of research is clinical, 0 otherwise. All regressions
include dummies for Congress terms, diseases, types of research and states. Cluster-robust standard errors












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































This section presents a simple static model that aims to formalize the description of the NIH
budget process. Let K denote the set of “research categories” partitioning the NIH budget. For
instance, K could be the set of diseases, the set of research institutes, the combination of both, or
any other set relevant for the classification of research projects. For any research category k ∈ K, the
level of public investment Fk ∈ R+. Investing Fk in research k yields a scientific return equal to akF γk ,
where γ ∈ (0, 1) and the productivity factor ak is independently drawn from a random variable with
density gk(ak), with a support in R+.
Agents and Information
Let C be the set of legislators deciding on the distribution of funds Fk ∈ R+, and N , an additional
agent that is not part of C. The set C may be part or the whole Congress, and may include the
President. I assume that the members of C do not know ak, whereas N does. In addition, I assume
that C has the possibility to delegate the allocation of a chosen amount of funds into the categories
of a chosen subset M of K to the NIH N , and decides of the amount of funds for the other categories
L ≡ K \M .
Preferences
















where ∀k ∈ K,Aik > 0, λ > 0. I assume that, at the end of the budget process, the allocation of funds










































k∈M F̂k = F
L ∪M = K,L ∩M = Ø
(10)
where: FL ≡ (Fk)k∈L for any L ⊂ K and g ≡ (gk)k∈K . A solution to that problem always exists,
since a solution of the sub-problem defined by adding the constraint L = L0 to the problem 10 has





∈ R+ × 2K × R+ #L∗ denote a solution of the previous program.
Proposition 1. Let K ≡ {1, ...., n} the set of research categories, gk(a), the probability density func-





i ∈ C ∪ {N}.




∈ R+ × 2K × R+ #L∗ of the Congress’ problem, then there





∈ R+ × 2K × R+ #L̃∗ of this problem such that 2 ∈ L̃∗.
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, and V (1) is the utility that would be achieved
if 1 and 2 were swapped, every other variable chosen by C remaining unchanged (note that the expected
allocation of funds across the research categories of K \ (L∗ ∪ {2}) by N is then the same before and
























is nonnegative since the function cα 7→ cαF̂ γα is convex and g2 second-order dominates g1. V is
nondecreasing in δ, V (0) ≤ V (1), so that the solution defined by the swap of 1 and 2 is indeed an
optimum of C’s maximization problem, in which 2 is not delegated.
The proposition states that C is more likely to delegate the allocation of funds across research
categories about which it has less precise information. The intuition for this result is similar to Aghion
and Tirole 1997’s distinction of forlam versus real authority.
Clinical research is more applied than basic research, and its potential outcomes are bounded by
the law due to its use of human data. Congressmen should thus have a more precise information about
clinical than basic research productivity. Prop 1 in this context thus implies that they will be more
likely to delegate the allocation decision of basic research funds to the NIH.
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Table 12: National Institutes of Health in 2002
National Cancer Institute
National Heart Lung and Blood Institute
National Institute of Dental and Craniofacial Research
National Institute of Diabetes and Digestive and Kidney Diseases
National Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke
National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases
National Institute of General Medical Sciences
Eunice Kennedy Shriver National Institute of Child Health and Human Development
National Eye Institute
National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences
National Institute on Aging
National Institute of Arthritis and Musculoskeletal and Skin Diseases
National Institute on Deafness and Other Communication Disorders
National Institute of Mental Health
National Institute on Drug Abuse
National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism
National Institute of Nursing Research
National Human Genome Research Institute
National Institute of Biomedical Imaging and Bioengineering
National Center for Research Resources
National Center for Complementary and Alternative Medicine
National Institute on Minority Health and Health Disparities
John E. Fogarty International Center for Advanced Study in the Health Sciences
National Library of Medicine
Office of the Director
Building and Facilities
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Table 13: Summary statistics by disease
Diseases #Deaths Log of life-years Log of funds
(/1000) lost
House House HouS Basic Clinical
Majority
Blood 33.9 7.8 7.79 7.8 18.5 17.7
.0403 .00987 .341 .454
CNS 48 8.05 8.02 8.06 20.5 20
.0169 .00543 .354 .474
Cardiovascular 754 10.6 10.6 10.6 20.1 19.8
.0555 .0272 .362 .355
Congenital 25 8.59 8.49 8.59 19.9 19.1
.0691 .0855 .221 .262
Digestive 158 9.29 9.31 9.28 19.8 19
.0339 .0382 .247 .53
Endocrine 52.2 8.14 8.12 8.14 20.9 19.7
.0287 .0457 .225 .333
HIV 18.8 7.88 7.77 7.85 21.1 20.6
.207 .129 .222 .414
Infectious 96.6 8.59 8.56 8.59 21.3 19.9
.0796 .0644 .277 .381
Psychiatric 40.5 8.38 8.28 8.38 19.9 20.6
.0547 .00936 .406 .472
Reproductive 80.6 8.62 8.63 8.62 20 19.7
.0319 .0172 .382 .547
Respiratory 213 9.57 9.57 9.58 18.9 18.2
.0471 .0123 .31 .535
Skin 20.8 7.34 7.31 7.34 19.5 19.4
.0381 .015 .281 .388
Urinary 32.7 7.58 7.59 7.58 19.1 18.3
.0403 .0446 .226 .417
Notes: columns 1 to 4 report the total number of deaths (in thousands), and normalized log of life-years
lost in the US in 1989, and the average normalized log of life-years lost in the House Appropriations
Subcommittee for the NIH, and in the House Majority for the whole period over the period 1985-2002, as
defined in equation 3. CNS comprises any nervous system disorder, Infectious includes any infection that
is not sexually transmitted, HIV comprises sexually-transmitted infections, Endocrine comprises diabetes
as well as other endocrine and metabolic disorders, Blood/Lymphatic comprises blood/lymphatic cancers
only, Psychiatric comprises mainly self-destructive behavioral disorders, Congenital comprises congenital
and developmental disorders. The funds are the NIH funds awarded through R grants in the period
1985-2002.
47
